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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to introduce the foreign reader to the concept 
of interpreting the law dominating in Polish jurisprudence.
In Polish legal doctrine, several important concepts of legal interpre-
tation have been developed. For the purposes of this paper, one will 
be mentioned, and the second one will be thoroughly developed. The 
fi rst is the clarifi cation concept of interpretation, developed by Prof. 
J. Wróblewski, while the second one is the derivative concept of the 
interpretation of the law, developed by Prof. Maciej Zieliński.
As a starting point, in order to indicate the sources of the derivative 
concept, one should take a closer look at the concept proposed by 
Prof. J. Wróblewski. The clarifi cation concept of the interpretation of 
law was based on the assumption that a part of the legal provisions 
does not require interpretation and is understood directly. The adopt-
ed assumption was justifi ed by the maxim clara non sunt interpretanda, 
and the process of interpretation itself according to this concept only 
became necessary when the legal provision was not suffi  ciently clear. 
In other words, interpretation can take place only where there is no 
direct understanding (isomorphia), i.e., in the situation of ambiguity 
of the lined provision1. The task of interpretation was to determine the 
meaning of particular words or phrases of legal language and thus de-
termine the contents of the “pattern of the proper conduct”. It is worth 
remembering that “the clarifi cation concept of interpretation can be 
1 T. Spyra, Granice wykładni prawa, Kraków 2006, p. 74–75.
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considered as an important part of the more general derivative concept 
of the interpretation”2.
The derivative concept itself was presented by Prof. Z. Ziembiński in 
1966, and developed by Prof. M. Zieliński in 19723. The latest version of 
the derivative concept of legal interpretation is the “integrated concept 
of the interpretation,” which is the subject of the paper.
Before discussing the main assumptions of the concept, it is necessary 
to return to the defi nitions used by Prof. M. Zieliński in his concept of 
interpretation. An important element of this concept is to distinguish 
the concept of legal provision and the standard of conduct, and then 
the legal norm (or legal standard). The distinction between a legal 
provision and a legal standard was introduced by Prof. Z. Ziembiński4. 
A legal provision is therefore a statement of the fundamental text of 
a legal act (it does not include, among other things, the legal basis 
of the event, or the preamble) taken from start to fi nish, regardless of 
the number of judgments appearing in it and regardless of whether 
or not it contains clearly separated elements. A legal standard, on the 
other hand, is a standard of conduct5 (i.e. a directive statement) which 
was established or recognised by the authorised body of the state, in the 
traditional jurisprudence of the tripartite structure (hypothesis-instruc-
tion-sanction), which clearly requires (prohibits) the particular entity, in 
specifi c circumstances, the specifi ed behaviour6. In Polish legal culture, 
legal standards are general and abstract standards.
Before it is possible to discuss the essence, phases and concepts 
connected to the derivative concept of legal interpretation, it is essen-
tial to defi ne the concept of interpretation. Interpretation of the law 
can be understood in the pragmatic sense, as a set of actions aimed 
at understanding legal provisions, while in the apragmatic sense this 
term means the result of these actions7. In the context of this paper, one 
2 P. Wronkowska, Z. Ziembiński, Zarys teorii prawa, Poznań 2001, p. 158; J. Mikołaje-
wicz, O możliwych rozwinięciach Macieja Zielińskiego koncepcji wykładni prawa, in: W poszu-
kiwaniu dobra wspólnego. Księga jubileuszowa Profesora Macieja Zielińskiego, red. A. Choduń, 
S. Czepita, Szczecin 2010.
3 M. Zieliński, Derywacyjna koncepcja wykładni jako koncepcja zintegrowana, “Ruch 
Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” 2006, rok LXVIII, z. 3, p. 94.
4 Z. Ziembiński, Przepis prawny a norma prawna, “Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny 
i Socjologiczny” 1960, rok XXII, z. 1, p. 105.
5 P. Wronkowska, Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa, Poznań 2005, p. 13.
6 Ibidem, p. 18.
7 Ibidem, p. 76–77.
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should develop the term ‘interpretation of the law’ in its pragmatic sense, 
which can be understood in two ways. Firstly, in the narrower sense, it 
includes actions which are, generally speaking, connected with under-
standing legal texts. Secondly, in the broader sense, alongside actions 
connected with the understanding of legal texts, it also covers actions 
consisting of the conclusions from the norms reconstructed from the 
legal text of other norms8, which is the consequence of the standards in 
the legal system expressed directly in the text and standards interpreted 
from it (inference rules)9.
The last issue that needs clarifi cation is the purpose for which the in-
terpretation of the legal provisions is made. In accordance with the con-
cept being discussed, the aim of interpretation is to “restore the stand-
ards expressed in the legal provisions with the perception of their 
contents”10. This is so-called “derivative detailing,” as Prof. M. Zieliński 
calls the originally understood goal of the interpretation he later mod-
ifi ed, which for the purpose of this paper can be characterised as the 
path using the right rules of interpretation from the rule by the standard 
expression to the legal standard and terminally its perception by the 
interpreter.
1. Features of the language of Polish legal texts
The derivative concept of the interpretation of the law is based on the 
knowledge of the language of legal texts and it is the recognition and 
the in-depth analysis of the language features in which the legal pro-
visions are formulated which then become the subject of the interpre-
tation, which in turn constitutes the core of the concept under discus-
sion11. Indeed, as indicated by Prof. M. Zieliński, the mere properties 
of the legal text “condition the derivative nature of the concept of legal 
interpretation”12.
The fi rst feature highlighted by Prof. M. Zieliński in characterising 
the legal text is its specifi c variability. The most important issue is the 
8 M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa. Zasady, reguły, wskazówki, Warszawa 2008, p. 48.
9 P. Wronkowska, op. cit., p. 92.
10 Ibidem, p. 257.
11 M. Zieliński, Derywacyjna koncepcja wykładni…, p. 96–99; M. Zieliński, Wykładnia 
prawa…, p. 101.
12 M. Zieliński, Derywacyjna koncepcja wykładni…, p. 95.
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fact that the volatility of a legal text occurs somehow beyond it (hence 
this “specifi city” of variability), it is “virtual,” because it occurs in legal 
acts changing other legal acts, or in those fragments of legal acts on the 
occasion changing other legal acts. The variability of the legal text was 
refl ected in the ordering phase of the interpretation.
Another feature is the observation that the legal text is written at the 
“descriptive level,” and it is read at the “normative level”. In the original 
version of the derivative concept of the interpretation this feature was 
described as the quasi-idiomacity of the text.
The third feature of the legal text is the fragmentation of standards 
(primarily syntactic and semantic) in the legal texts, which will be dis-
cussed in greater depth in the part describing the reconstruction phase 
of the interpretation. It is the feature of the legal text which the author 
of the concept determines as the “most derivative”13.
Another feature of legal texts are that the language of these texts 
belong to the Polish language in general, not colloquial, and the for-
mulation of legal texts based on a dictionary of ambiguous words. Of 
course, the role of the legislator is to use formulations in a clear and 
precise way, although this will not always be possible. In order to obtain 
the potentially full explicitness, the editor of the text can use two basic 
tools, i.e., legal defi nitions and a disambiguating language context.
Another noteworthy feature of the legal text is the presence of vague 
and imprecise phrases, such as “substantial circumstance,” “substantial 
damage,” “high degree,” or “special danger”. Their presence in the legal 
text requires the interpreter to mark out the borders of the “blur belt of 
vague phrases,” which in practice allows the interpreter to state whether 
the event occurred within the range of the given name, or the event 
beyond this scope.
2. Phases of interpreting the derivative concept
An interpretation of the derivative concept is made in three separate 
phases, which include a set of directives used in order to achieve interim 
results, which in total lead to the determination of the clear legal norm.
These directives can be combined into one strand comprising three 
phases of interpretation: ordering, reconstructive and perceptual14. 
13 Ibidem, p. 98.
14 M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa…, p. 319.
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Apart from these three phases of interpretation, the fundamental na-
ture of the derivative concept requires certain general directives of 
legal interpretation to be used regardless of the phase the interpreter 
is dealing with. The aim of these general directives is to emphasise 
that the process of interpretation should apply to every legal provision, 
regardless of the degree of its prima facie understanding. Their aim is 
also to stress that every interpretation decision should be justifi ed, or 
that one should use the legal text published offi  cially.
2.1. Ordering phase
The fi rst phase of the interpretation in the concept outlined by Prof. 
M. Zieliński is to eliminate the consequences of the variability of legal 
texts. Therefore, its main principles are to determine the validity of the 
legal provision and the word shape in the adopted interpretative mo-
ment and also to determine whether the provision being interpreted 
is in force at the time to which the interpretation (validation) applies15.
This phase consists of a series of rules and interpretation guidelines. 
However, for the purposes of this paper, it should be emphasised that 
the goal of this phase is to determine the valid legal state and contents of 
the provision in question. Prior to the reconstruction phase of the inter-
pretation, it is necessary to determine whether the particular provision 
(framework, central, supplementary, or modifying)16 at the moment of 
interpretation was not changed or repealed, and to establish the verbal 
shape in which it is valid.
2.2. Reconstructive phase
The reconstructive phase of the interpretation begins the substantive 
work on understanding the given provision in order to reconstruct the 
standard expressed in the provision17. The purpose of the interpreta-
tion directives attributed by Prof. M. Zieliński to this phase is to obtain 
15 K. Płeszka, Wykładnia rozszerzająca, Warszawa 2010, p. 147.
16 B. Kanarek, M. Zieliński, Porządkująca faza wykładni prawa, “Ruch Prawniczy, Eko-
nomiczny i Socjologiczny” 2001, rok LXIII, z. 3, s. 1–5, https://repozytorium.amu.edu.
pl/jspui/bitstream/10593/5170/1/01_B_Kanarek_M_Zielinski_Porz%C4%85dkuj%C4%-
85ca%20faza%20wyk%C5%82adni%20prawa_1-12.pdf (accessed: 19 I 2015).
17 M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa…, p. 330–334.
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a standard expression, including determination of the recipient (the 
subject to which the order or prohibition of action is directed) and 
determination of the circumstances in which the specifi ed behaviour 
is ordered or prohibited. A standard expression does not yet constitute 
a legal standard due to its potential ambiguity18.
According to the interpretation concept proposed by Prof. M. Zie-
liński, this phase should begin with recognizing the syntactic features 
of the provision in question, which will aff ect the further course of the 
interpretation process. Thus, the interpreter should fi rst determine 
whether the provision is single- or multi-sentence. A multi-sentence 
provision should be treated as the “aggregate of provisions” and a sep-
arate interpretation procedure should be used for each sentence. The 
next step is to determine whether the provision is a framework provi-
sion and for how many standards. A framework provision should be 
interpreted independently, while a non-framework provision in the 
context of the framework provision. Continuing the attempt to repro-
duce the standard expression from the legal provision, in reference to 
the framework provision, it should be determined whether the provision 
is normatively complete, and in case of normative incompleteness, the 
provision’s supplementary elements should be identifi ed (i.e. to deter-
mine the recipient or circumstances). Supplementing the incomplete 
framework provision (or when it was not needed and the framework 
provision was complete), the provision should be treated as the central 
provision. One should establish whether it is complete in content and 
whether it does not require modifi cation. If the central provision does 
not contain modifi ers in the legal text or they are applied, this phase 
ends with the formulation of the standard expression.
As it follows from the reconstructive phase of the interpretation, it is 
important whether the standard implementation can be reconstructed 
from one provision, or whether it is necessary to use several. In this con-
text it should be stated that the fragmentation of legal standards in the 
provisions is characteristic for the structure of legal text. Prof. M. Zieliński 
distinguishes two basic ways of fragmenting standards, i.e., syntactic 
and semantic, sometimes also indicating an explanatory fragmentation.
Syntactic fragmentation19 of the legal standard in the process of 
forming the legal text consists of separating the components of legal 
18 P. Wronkowska, op. cit., p. 81.
19 M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa…, p. 115.
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norms, such as the defi nition of the recipient, circumstances, order 
or prohibition of behaviour, and placing them in diff erent provisions. 
Non-separation elements, or the order or prohibition with the specifi ca-
tion of the behaviour are placed in the provision engaging the most im-
portant normative matter and are hence called the framework provision. 
In the reconstruction phase, the framework provision subjects to the 
supplementation with other elements shaping the standard expression.
Content fragmentation20 consists of introducing other provisions 
into the legal text, alongside the framework provision, thus modifying 
its content. This type of fragmentation is often encountered in civil law21. 
Due to the content nature of modifi cation, Prof. M. Zieliński introduced 
the concept of the central provision. This defi nition is used to determine 
a framework provision which is syntactically complete, i.e., containing all 
the syntactic elements of the legal standard indicated above22. It should 
be shown that in the legislative texts in which the semantic fragmentation 
of the standard has been applied, even despite the syntactically complete 
expression of the standard, it will not be fully expressed semantically, 
because its elements are contained in the modifying provisions23. Such 
a constructed central provision is an incomplete central provision, re-
quiring modifi cation. From the practical point of view the problem of 
the semantic fragmentation of legal standards and the need to modify 
them is particularly important and often diffi  cult in practice. After all, 
it should be noted that it is possible to fi nd provisions modifying the 
central provision at a considerable distance from it, which may lead to 
diffi  culties in the process of interpreting the law. What is more, the pro-
visions modifying the central provision can be found in another legal act.
2.3. Perceptual phase of the interpretation
At the beginning it should be noted that the concept of perception in 
the derivative concept of legal interpretation is used in a dual meaning24, 
as the original perception and the fi nal perception25.
20 Ibidem, p. 124.
21 K. Płeszka, op. cit., p. 154.
22 M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa…, p. 124
23 M. Zieliński, Z. Radwański, Stosowanie i wykładnia prawa cywilnego, in: System Prawa 
Prywatnego, t. 1, red. M. Safj an, Warszawa 2007, s. 502.
24 M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa…, p. 335–350.
25 Ibidem, p. 235.
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The original perception corresponds to the “direct understanding” in 
the semantic concept of interpretation26. However, it should be noted 
that the author of the derivative concept of interpretation has directly 
indicated that direct understanding, or the original perception, does 
not replace interpretation, and it does not make it unnecessary. Cau-
tion is necessary here in the context of the rest of this paper, which 
will indicate the position of Prof. M. Zieliński towards the principle of 
clara non sunt interpretanda (the principle clara). At this point, for the 
purpose of discussing the perceptive phase of the interpretation, it is 
suffi  cient to show that the derivative concept rejects the principle clara, 
and it should certainly be stated that it rejects such an understanding 
of this principle, according to which clear provisions prima facie do not 
require interpretation.
The fi nal perception constitutes the fi nal interpretation, as it con-
sists of the “fi nal reading of the given expression, having the specifi ed 
sense ending the process of the interpretation,” i.e. “the appropriate 
understanding of the specifi c message given in the legal text by the 
legislature”27.
The perceptive phase of the interpretation refers to the fi nal percep-
tion of the standard expression. This means that activities implemented 
during this phase of the interpretation only commence after reconstruc-
tive activities have been completed and the standard expression of the 
structure obtained: addressee, circumstances, order or the prohibition 
of the behaviour, characterised by the normative fullness and logical.
Such a reconstructed expression is indeed complete in the sense 
that it contains all elements of the standard expression. However, it is 
not yet a clear expression. Therefore, it is necessary to pass through the 
fi nal phase of the interpretation to obtain a fully precise legal standard.
The perceptual phase of the interpretation refers to the process of 
determining the meaning of a given standard expression through the 
defi nitive determination of all its component expressions, i.e., words or 
verbal clusters occurring in the expression. To determine the meaning 
of particular words or expressions one should refer them to the legal 
defi nitions occurring in the legal text or sometimes in another legal 
text subjected to interpretation. If one fi nds the legal defi nition of the 
given expression, one should subject it to interpretation according to 
26 K. Płeszka, op. cit., p. 158.
27 M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa…, p. 235–236.
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procedures referring to other provisions, although without the possibili-
ty of break its clear linguistic meaning. When, however, it is not possible 
to obtain the explicitness of the interpreted expression using the legal 
defi nition, one should recognise that it is ambiguous on the grounds of 
language directives and that the interpretation procedures should be 
initiated. These are based on non-linguistic directives, i.e., systemic and 
functional. In the event of further occurrence of discrepancies between 
the results obtained, one should determine the hierarchy of these, justify 
them in detail and select the meaning of a given expression which is 
according to the highest preferred values, in particular those protected 
by the Constitution. However, one must remember that the directive 
concept of the interpretation assumes the interpretation of words or 
verbal clusters also in cases where these are unambiguous in the lan-
guage. The process of interpretation in the perception phase, and thus 
the interpretation process, ends when after carrying out the aforemen-
tioned procedure in relation to all words, one obtains the explicitness 
of the standard expression, and thus from it one recreates the standard 
of conduct that is subject only to perception.
3. The derivative concept of legal interpretation, 
and the principle of clara non sunt interpretanda
The maxim clara non sunt interpretanda has a semiotically dual character. 
It can be understood in a descriptive and directive way. Prof. M. Zie-
liński indicates that the clara principle can be understood in several 
ways, which also depend on the way the concept of the interpretation 
is understood28.
Hence, the clara principle should be understood as the statement 
that due to actual reasons, there is no need to interpret (the potential 
further interpretation – interpretatio cessat in claris) the specifi ed cultural 
creations, whose meaning is objectively clear, or their understand-
ing does not require any special eff ort. Moreover, understanding this 
principle may refer to a situation in which there was no “situation of 
the interpretation,” which leads to the diff erentiation of the situation 
of interpretation and isomorphia known to the semantic concept of 
interpretation.
28 Ibidem, p. 59; K. Płeszka, op. cit., p. 187.
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The principle analysed in its directive meaning can be understood 
as a total directive, which requires the specifi c procedure of the in-
terpreter while carrying out the interpretation and, secondly, as the 
functioning and valid standard of conduct of a given culture, in par-
ticular the legal standard governing specifi c interpretation behaviour. 
It should also be emphasised that in both directive versions, this rule 
may concern the admissibility of the interpretation or the admissi-
bility of the further use of the interpretation, in the form of specifi ed 
interpretation rules.
The criticism of the clara principle is based on six theses.
Firstly, it is not embedded in the culture of Roman law and its roots 
are very modest, and therefore the elimination of this rule does not 
constitute a breach of broadly understood tradition and legal culture29.
Secondly, the acceptance of this principle would require acceptance 
of the distinction of the situation of interpretation and isomorphia in-
troduced by Prof. J. Wróblewski. However, this distinction should be 
rejected, because understanding the legal text is possible only through 
its interpretation.
Thirdly, accepting the clara principle will lead to a signifi cant meth-
odological error, namely the lack of the criterion of distinguishing the 
situation of understanding the law and the situation of its interpretation. 
Furthermore, it may lead to conceptual confusion and the clara principle 
being identifi ed with the principle of interpretatio cessat in calris.
Fourthly, the author refers to pragmatic arguments connected with 
the practical use of the law (on the offi  cial and judicial application of 
the law). They refer, among other things, to the fact that it is diffi  cult to 
indicate an indisputable example of the possibilities of using the clara 
principle. Its use does not facilitate the work of entities applying the law, 
and on the contrary, the principle of the interpretation economy leads 
to mistakes in interpreting the law. Therefore, the clara principle should 
be recognised as harmful in the course of applying the law.
Fifthly, referring to subjective issues, Prof. M. Zieliński poses a ques-
tion, namely whose clarity of understanding is the referred to by the 
clara principle, or in other words, whose doubts and to what degree 
the responsibility for the lack of doubt falls on the person who does 
not have them? In particular, the ethical dimension of this argument is 
29 W. Rozwadowski, Etiam clarum ius exigit interpretationem, in: W poszukiwaniu dobra 
wspólnego…, p. 37.
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manifested in power relations, when the clara principle can be used to 
limit the rights of the citizen in relation to the state.
Sixthly, the clara principle can be used as a veil in the justifi cation 
of ratione imperii.
Thus, the derivative concept of legal interpretation adopted the in-
verse principle to the clara principle, i.e. the principle of omnia sunt 
interpretanda. According to the rules of derivational interpretation, each 
legal text and its all expressions are subject to interpretation in the pro-
cess of understanding and using the law. Moreover, the approach to the 
clara principle and explanation during the interpretation of all, even the 
slightest, ambiguities is refl ected in the next property of this concept, 
i.e., clarifi cation30, which is revealed both in the reconstructive and 
perceptual phase. Therefore, it should be indicated that understanding 
and rejecting the clara principle constitutes one of the most important 
assumptions of the derivative concept of interpretation.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the dominant concept of legal interpretation in Polish 
jurisprudence is M. Zieliński’s derivational concept. This concept forms 
the basis and is also a point of reference for any discussion on the 
problem of legal interpretation in Polish jurisprudence. Although the 
narrow scope of the present work makes it diffi  cult to present a full 
picture of the problem, it does off er readers unfamiliar with the Polish 
legal system an insight into this concept. 
Comprising several successive phases (ordering, reconstructive and 
perceptional), the concept itself constitutes a coherent whole. The no-
tional framework set out by the author allowed the precise distinction of 
legal norms from legal regulations of norm-forming expression. A legal 
norm, inferred from a legal provision and with a tripartite structure (hy-
pothesis – disposition – sanction), may be read from a legal provision 
(legislation) using the directives of interpretative procedure developed 
by Prof. M. Zielinski in each phase of interpretation. One of the bases of 
the concept is the rejection of the clara non sunt interpretanda principle 
and the order that every legal regulation should be subjected to inter-
pretation (omnia sunt interpretanda), regardless of how it is understood 
30 M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa…, p. 259–260.
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prima facie. It is this assumption that distinguishes Prof. M. Zieliński’s 
concept from Prof. J. Wróblewski’s concept of clarifi cation.
However, this analysis of the characteristics of the language in Pol-
ish legal texts might be acknowledged as the basis of the derivational 
concept of legal interpretation. It is such characteristics as well as the 
characteristic variability of legal texts, which is produced through other 
legal texts, and the facts that they are written at the descriptive level 
and read at the normative level that form the axis of Zieliński’s concept. 
Yet it is important to note that the author himself identifi ed statements 
regarding the deconstruction of legal norms in regulations as the most 
derivational characteristic (he points primarily to syntactic and con-
tent-based deconstruction, as well as explanatory deconstruction). Un-
derstanding the principles of this deconstruction of legal norms in legal 
regulations enables fl awless interpretation of such legal norms in even 
the most complex of legal texts, by means of a conscious search for all 
elements of norm-shaped formulation and all regulations modifying 
the framework regulation.
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